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Translation
To see oneself is to see through the eyes of the other, but 
this other is not another who stands outside of one’s own 
mind. This other is the other through which one is oneself, 
through which one is made oneself. I am but a fiction, as is 
she. This is not to say that we are not. We are indeed, but 
the we presented here are a fiction insofar as all truth must 
be told as a fiction, for all told truth has the structure of 
narration. Narration must be narrated from a point of view. 
One might have chosen to narrate the truth of oneself 
through the first person, but the first-person narrator cannot 
tell the story of esteem.
Esteem is the truth of oneself through the eyes of the 
other, and any truth of esteem must be told from the per-
spective of that other, through the spectating other. Thus, 
any story of esteem is veiled. The truth of one-self is always 
hidden to oneself when esteem is concerned, for there is no 
such thing as self-esteem. Esteem must come from the 
other who is in one’s own mind. What’s mistaken for self-
esteem is but a translation of the discourse of desire. And 
it’s for this reason that I must write of her. And who, exactly, 
am I? I am not one person, nor am I an amalgamation of 
people who have loved her. I’m not a representation of a 
person or of people, but the discourse through which she is 
a woman longing for air. I have been lent her voice. I am 
the translator through which she is now speaking. The 
translator is the producer of the discourse that suffocates 
her and allows her to breathe in gasped breaths, the pro-
ducer of the discourse that both takes away her voice and 
gives her voice.
She herself is not who she is, though she is indeed 
another who is. She must exist, but it must be that she 
remains veiled to both of us who are presented in this dis-
course. She must remain veiled, and she is indeed veiled by 
this discourse which is not, in actuality, my own.
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Abstract
This essay is the third and final of a three-part series titled “The Veil of Esteem: On Seeing Oneself Being Seen.” Inspired 
by Walter Benjamin’s “reflection through vignette” method, I inquire into the notions and interconnections between 
memory and esteem. Esteem is the truth of oneself through the eyes of the other, and any truth of esteem must be 
told from the perspective of that other, through the spectating other. Thus, I find that any story of esteem is veiled. This 
final part, A Loan, posits that our unified recollection is a fiction culled from fragmented truths. This isn’t all bad. It’s the 
only way we can shape the heterogeneous multiplicity of happy accidents, shaping it in a poetic way. We need to look 
back from the future to cultivate things that may turn out to be desirable that are happening now. In other words, we 
can’t leave accident to chance. Otherwise, we’re left with a nothingness that’s but a lack of vision. The story is narrated 
not as a representation of a person or of people, but the discourse through which I have been lent her voice. I am the 
translator through which she is now speaking. The translator is the producer of the discourse that suffocates her and 
allows her to breathe in gasped breaths, the producer of the discourse that both takes away her voice and gives her 
voice. The first part of this series, “Fragment/Never Thinking of Tomorrow,” appears in International Review of Qualitative 
Research, Volume 5, Issue 1; the second part, “Riddle and Accident,” appears in Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies, 
Volume 12, Issue 2.
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Tobacco Is Its Own Best Filter
Strangely, I found myself insisting that she smoke in my 
apartment. Now, she’s about to board a train to see her 
mother. I had packed her a lunch that I had accidentally left 
in the refrigerator. I bum a cigarette from her while she 
smokes one. I’ve always hated ultralights, but it doesn’t 
make sense. While there are many ways to stop resisting 
death, lung cancer is somehow comforting. Lung cancer 
isn’t risky but certain. Lung cancer isn’t a mere suspicion. 
Furthermore, it’s common.
I tell her that I’ll see her on Sunday. Her breath tastes 
only mildly of tobacco, much more of burning paper, but 
sadly mine must be the same. I’ve always hated ultralights, 
and she is beautiful.
Tandem Bike
There’s a tandem bike that my grandparents used to have, 
one gear, backpedal to break. It was yellow, and it made 
noises not unlike their washing machine. The kickstand 
came out too far and would contact one of the pedals every 
time it came around. The rhythm was reassuring, the sound 
sometimes annoying.
I remember where the bike used to stay in their garage. It 
was always tangled between the wall’s exposed two-by-
fours and tennis ball hoppers. The hoppers themselves 
always seemed to be flush with the bumper of whatever car 
the garage was meant to protect and that car would’ve been 
either an all-blue crushed-velvet interior Buick or a white 
Volvo, tan interior. The tedious maneuvering needed to free 
the bike was always eventually rewarding, especially when 
we—one of five cousins and I—had managed not to scratch 
the precious car or upset the collection of precariously hung 
rakes and garden tools. It was also a relief to breathe air that 
wasn’t that of the garage.
I only have a handful of vivid memories involving that 
yellow bike. The content of one those memories is the reason 
why I have three scars on my right knee. My cousin Tito 
drove us onto an unpaved road. I had momentarily fallen off, 
though not completely. Gravel is rough, and I have no nostal-
gia for it. Furthermore, I have no nostalgia for the time I 
accepted an ill conceived dare to be pulled on a brakeless 
scooter roped to the back of it. That was the reason for a scar 
on my right elbow which is now apparently gone. Yet another 
memory is of an event that caused no scars, but the dare was 
no less ill-conceived. I was to ride solo, seated in the back, 
hunched over the second set of handlebars while reaching 
forward to steer down the steps of a nearby Pentecostal 
church. Pentecostals must like to climb. I’m not sure how I 
survived. Still, tandem bikes are meant for two.
A good, noninjury-related memory I have of the bike 
seemed to be a screen memory, but a picture my mom sent 
me years later proves it to be actual. I remember riding 
behind my father and watching the world go by from the 
side. His cologne smelled somewhat better than the garage, 
and in this memory, I had somehow managed to stay unac-
quainted with the ground. I was very happy.
In the memorialized moment, however, I look pensive, 
almost sad. The shutter speed must’ve been really fast 
because you can see the spokes without motion blur. In the 
instant made perpetual, the bike seems strangely, impossi-
bly balanced. The background is of the hospital where my 
father worked. It was across the street from the house. 
There’s a Beetle parked in a place that doesn’t look like a 
parking spot. Maybe it was an emergency. I have no memo-
ries of how my father’s outfit matched the bike. He mustn’t 
have anticipated how time yellows old pictures. I’m not 
sure how young I was, but I couldn’t reach the pedals, 
something I also don’t remember.
She’s five years my junior, and I wonder if she’d been 
born then. She’s happiest on her bike, happiest in motion, 
happiest in the open, perhaps then at peace. It’d be nice to 
ride a tandem bike with her. If I become an obstruction to 
the view, she can drive and I can look to the side, though I’d 
have the urge to show her my scars first.
Smoking in the Open
[S]moking is nonetheless an expressly human attitude, 
and I do not think there is any comparable animal atti-
tude. Smoking, on the contrary, is the most exterior thing 
to our understanding. Insofar as we are absorbed in 
smoking we escape ourselves, we slip into a semiabsence, 
and if it is true that a concern for elegance is always con-
nected to waste, smoking is elegance, is silence itself.
—Georges Bataille, 2001, The Unfinished System of Non-
knowledge, p. 6
Not only has it become otherwise illegal but also we have 
to smoke in the open. The animal is in the open but doesn’t 
know that it is. When we’re aware, there’s only conceal-
ment and disconcealment. But if we’re in fact slipping into 
semiabsence when smoking, then we’re indeed the closest 
we can be to the pure openness of exposure. We aren’t, in 
other words, just twenty-five feet from the entrance of an 
interior. Smoking, then, is the model of strictly human con-
sumption par excellence. When we smoke we consume 
from habit, not from need. Breathing becomes inoperative 
and deliberate. And not only are we the furthest from being 
a creature of need when we smoke, but we partake in a 
consumption that’s at the same time a nonconsumption. First, 
it’s a nonconsumption insofar as the cigarette is consumed by 
proxy from the fact that we’ve set it on fire. Second, we don’t 
fully absorb the smoke but must exhale it. Last, those of us 
who chain-smoke do so from the standpoint of continuity. 
True, there can be no concept of continuity in the open, but 
then again, a semiabsence is also a semipresence.
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Secondhand Smoke
She tries to remain detached from popular culture. She 
jokes about being elitist but does so from an insecurity 
about really thinking people think she is. It’s a mere insecu-
rity. She isn’t elitist. She’s only generous, at times to a fault.
Consider enjoyment from the standpoint of usufruct, 
the right to enjoyment. When usufruct concerns a rival 
good, all those with the right to enjoy who enjoy the good 
foreclose the possibility of enjoyment for others. I think 
part of her not wanting to be common is related to the 
adherence to the principle not to squander resources and to 
the adherence to the principle to consume responsibly. It’s 
as though if she partakes in the common, she forecloses 
the possibility of others enjoying it. Yes, she enjoys the 
rarity of a rare enjoyment, but it’s also wanting to partake 
in something that doesn’t steal enjoyment from the neigh-
bor. It’s the same as a considerate person not wanting to 
fill the air we all need to breathe with secondhand smoke. 
I miss her generosity.
Looking Up
If nothing in us veils the celestial glories, we are 
worthy of infinite love. Compared with the person I 
love, the universe seems poor and empty. This uni-
verse isn’t “risked” since it’s not “perishable.”
—Georges Bataille, 1994, On Nietzsche, “Diary: 
February-April 1944,” p. 69
I don’t often look up at night, but I didn’t want the smoke 
to go across the way to the people who were only having 
beers. The stars are pretty, though, but I know I’ll still not 
remember that they’re there. I’m sitting in the courtyard of 
my building. I’ve lived here for about a year, but it hadn’t 
occurred to me to use the seating outside. She makes me 
think differently, and I like it. She’s also right. It’s a good 
community space.
The people of whom I’m being considerate are sitting 
where we once sat. I can’t sit there anymore, nor can I sleep 
on my side of the bed, the side she once usurped from me. I 
can’t sit where we used to sit, one because it’s too lonely, 
and two because there are things that fall from the trees. 
They’re not exactly acorns. I’m scared for the beer couple, 
but maybe they’ll be lucky.
When we were sitting where we had once sat, I had 
explained that I can be fascinated by almost anything 
whatever, almost like a child. As a complaint, she reminded 
me that I wasn’t. Hers was a response to a complaint of 
mine, a complaint only thinly veiled. Regrettably, I had 
expressed this complaint as an assertion that I can be fas-
cinated by almost anything. I had complained because I 
hadn’t yet understood why she seemed to deliberately 
limit her interests. Now, I think I understand, and what I 
understand to be an understanding is something that also 
makes me miss her.
She can’t be interested in the things that most interest me 
because she doesn’t wish to steal my enjoyment. I doubt 
that she knows this about herself. She perhaps dismisses 
this as her being at times difficult. It isn’t this. Again, she’s 
only generous, at times to a fault.
She asked me if my fascination with almost anything 
whatever was the reason why I was so fascinated with her. I 
corrected her. I’m fascinated by almost anything, but with 
her, I’m in love. I don’t know that it made things any better. 
I remember the subject changing, but to what, I don’t recall. 
By this time, we were upstairs. Also, I don’t remember if I 
had gotten to explain my idea of how people are like con-
stellations. Freud liked that term a lot, and though I use it 
somewhat differently, I like it a lot, too, constellation.
Literally, the term means stars with each other. It’s a plu-
ral being-with that’s the precondition for the being of a singu-
lar being, and that being is arbitrarily defined by a formation 
of perceptions. This is like a bear; that’s something like 
a ladle; that’s an even bigger like a ladle. But what the 
ancients didn’t know, and maybe Freud would’ve been 
unaware of this also, is that the stars aren’t exactly with 
each other. They’re all different distances, so taken together, 
the origins of the light we perceive are records of different 
moments in time. It’s only the perception that’s synchronic. 
In this way, a constellation is most like a painted portrait, 
different from the modern photograph, somewhat like a 
daguerreotype. Our unified idea is a fiction culled from 
fragmented truths.
I’ve known her for but a short time, but I see things in her 
that I’ve seen in other people, things to which I’m attracted. 
But it isn’t the case that I’ve put her together from these frag-
ments. I’m only the perceiver. It’s an accident of the universe 
that’s made her the constellation of everything I’m able to 
recognize and value, that and then some. But consistent with 
my definition, is there an arbitrariness to my perception? 
Yes, there’s arbitrariness insofar as what I’m able to perceive 
is—can only be—founded on what I’ve perceived before, 
perceived not in her, but elsewhere. This is like a bear. And 
doubtless, there are things that I don’t perceive, things that, 
given the opportunity, I won’t. Further still, there are always 
stars that you need to ignore to make the outline, but this 
isn’t to say that one doesn’t see them. I don’t hold her to an 
impossible ideal. Her perfection includes imperfection, and I 
wouldn’t wish to annihilate the stars in between. Perhaps 
even some I would’ve disliked. Still, she can be whatever 
she is—or become that. I’ll always look up to her, but sadly, 
her light is now from the past.
Perishable Constellations
The idea of eternal recurrence derived its luster from the 
fact that it was no longer possible, in all circumstances, 
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to expect a recurrence of conditions across any inter-
val of time shorter than that provided by eternity. The 
recurrence of quotidian constellations became gradu-
ally less frequent and there could arise, in conse-
quence, the obscure presentiment that henceforth one 
must rest content with cosmic constellations. Habit, 
in short, made ready to surrender some of its preroga-
tives.
—Walter Benjamin, 2006b, “Central Park,” p. 166
Not unlike opera, jazz is a heterogeneous multiplicity, a 
constellation, so to speak. It’s a bit different insofar as it’s 
improvised. True, it isn’t as though there isn’t improviza-
tion in the classical tradition. I’m thinking of basso con-
tinuo, for instance. She told me she likes Bach, and he used 
this device, as one did during the period. This isn’t to men-
tion all the written works that were titled with Impromptu. 
However, jazz developed a bit differently. By then, we had 
recorded sound. Each instant of the music could be captured 
in the instant. What was impromptu could be repeated, even 
studied. I told her that I find it difficult to go to live jazz 
events for the reason that if I end up liking the music, I 
know that I’ll never be able to listen to it again. It’s really 
stupid. I’m missing out.
Benjamin is referencing Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal 
recurrence. He misunderstands it slightly, however. He 
comes at the idea through the lens of a displacing nostalgia, 
a nostalgia that’s pained to return home to what can be 
repeated, but it must settle for what isn’t perishable. This is 
why habit is made to surrender some of its prerogatives. 
Both completeness and continuity are important motifs in 
his work. The collection is important for Benjamin, and one 
can think of the eternal recurrence as something assimilable 
to this tendency to collect. But eternal recurrence isn’t nos-
talgia. Eternal recurrence doesn’t make habit surrender the 
habitual but puts repetition outside of the habitual tense. 
How so?
The habitual perfects itself and starts over to perfect itself 
in the same way, only in a different iteration. Furthermore, 
eternal recurrence is a doctrine of willing, not one of com-
pulsion. There’s something compulsive about nostalgia, and 
if eternal recurrence can be said to make something surren-
der some of its prerogatives, one might say that it makes 
nostalgia surrender its compulsion while allowing it to 
retain its trajectory of return. In eternal recurrence, there’s 
return, but it isn’t the return of what Hegel called a spurious 
infinity, the infinity of a ceaseless just one more, just once 
more. It’s infinite return in the sense of boundlessness. It’s 
a return freed of the compulsion that otherwise binds one 
within the habitual tense. Thus, the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence isn’t one of perpetual birthing, of a blind propa-
gative drive, but one of never giving up on one’s desire. 
Eternal recurrence is the doctrine of willing to will, this 
when one is freed to will not to will, when willing not to 
will exists as an impotentiality preserved in one’s potential-
ity. Without this impotentiality, one can’t say willing to will 
is a potentiality to begin with. Furthermore, one can’t be 
freed in this way if one is under the thumb of nonvolitional 
compulsion. Eternal recurrence takes a necessary risk inso-
far as it’s the doctrine of becoming who one is once and for 
all. In other words, Phoenix is a nice place to have visited.
Dogs
If “to hear” is to understand the sense, to listen is to be 
straining toward a possible meaning, and consequently 
one that is not immediately accessible.
* * *
To be listening will always, then, be to be straining 
toward or in an approach to the self. Approach to the 
self: neither to a proper self (I), nor to the self of an 
other, but to the form or structure of self as such.
—Jean-Luc Nancy, 2007, Listening, pp. 6, 9
If to listen is to listen for the structure of self as such, then 
to listen is to listen for the subject. But how might we con-
ceive of the subject? The subject isn’t the special being, but 
that which the signifier represents for another signifier. The 
subject is what we find between signifiers. Thus, Nancy 
writes that this self is neither the self belonging to an I, nor 
a self belonging to another. It’s in this way that the subject 
comes into desire. Desire isn’t the space of an “I” and a 
“you,” but the space that comes to be occupied by the sub-
ject. And though Nancy isn’t writing about desire, we can 
apply his reasoning to desire and say that the subject is 
apprehended as a subject of desire through the activity of 
listening. It’s through listening that what was formerly an 
“I” and “you” become no longer two, for it isn’t the case 
that in desire, a signifier interposes itself between two sub-
jects. Rather, there are two signifiers, and the subject comes 
to be between them. There is a single subject, but a subject 
that nonetheless remains split. Thus, it isn’t the case that the 
two simply become monadic but that the two become what 
can only be described as no longer two. But this is perhaps 
hopelessly abstract. A metaphor:
There was a time when I waited for her calls. To listen 
for the phone isn’t the same as to be listening to someone 
speak or to be listening to a piece of music. The difference 
is that in waiting for a phone call, one awaits a signal in the 
midst of silence. Listening can be a type of waiting. It’s this 
type of patient listening that’s at play in desire. I wait by the 
phone when she isn’t calling me. We are two. Were I to hear 
her voice addressing me, to hear her voice utter my name, in 
listening, the self I would find wouldn’t be myself, but the 
structure of self. When I’d answer her, the same would 
occur for her. What we’d share is that in each other’s voice, 
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we’d find the structure of self, we’d find the subject. So I 
await the signal of the phone only for the reason that it pre-
cedes hearing her voice. And why am I attached to her 
voice? The voice isn’t what communicates a message. 
That’s a task charged to language. The voice is the noncom-
municative sound that comes from the throat. The voice, 
then, is an empty signifier. I miss hearing her voice’s gentle 
cadences, miss listening to the medium that once carried my 
name. For me, her voice is unforgettable. When my phone 
rings now, I find myself happy only as a momentary reflex.
I once compared the excitement I felt to see her again to 
how my dog must’ve felt when I returned home. Now, I feel 
not like my dog, but Pavlov’s, his dog, but only in reverse. 
When hope is lost, how does one stop awaiting her call? 
The sound I associate with what was once an exquisite wait-
ing persists. The silence refuses to leave me in peace, and I 
find it more disruptive than any manner of noise.
Potentiality
To be potential means: to be one’s own lack, to be in 
relation to one’s own incapacity. Beings that exist in 
the mode of potentiality are capable of their own 
impotentiality; and only in this way do they become 
potential.
—Giorgio Agamben, 1999, Potentialities, p. 182
To be capable of one’s own impotentiality is a necessary 
condition to exist in the mode of potentiality. In other 
words, impotentiality must be preserved in the potential. 
While it would seem that potentiality is the exhaustion of 
impotentiality, potentiality can’t be anything that forecloses 
the potential to not-be. Were potentiality to exhaust impo-
tentiality, then potentiality would become perfected, com-
pleted, and thus no longer potential as such, but a potential 
that’s either no longer or a potential that’s temporarily sus-
pended until impotentiality can return. Just as the analyst 
mustn’t place limits on the analysand with regard either to 
becoming who she is or not becoming this, we can’t place 
limits on what we bring forth from the nothingness that’s 
always already there, the nothingness that’s a necessity of 
that which isn’t of the will, but that’s contingent with regard 
to the will. Nothingness is the necessary background of the 
will from which the drawn line of potentiality emerges. 
Nothingness is the silence from which the song of language 
emerges. If potential gives birth to that which births itself, if 
potential gives birth to poiesis, then nothingness is potential’s 
dark womb. Nothingness is the matrix of potentiality, and to 
remain one with and within it is to endure anxiety’s abyss.
Chance and Nothingness
[I]t is a matter of detecting, within the extremely 
impure, complex composition that is an opera, the 
moment when the immanent purity of this very impu-
rity emerges. Thus, the question clearly has to do 
with the fact that the assemblage of the Idea’s artistic 
materials, the way the Idea is materially constituted, 
actually occurs within a heterogeneous multiplicity.  
A multiplicity might be said to be heterogeneous 
when it is composed of chance and nothingness.
—Alain Badiou, 2010, Five Lessons on Wagner, p. 136
She often goes to the opera. If memory serves, she takes the 
train at least four times a year. What does she like about the 
opera? She likes partaking in a rare pleasure. There’s a lot 
of effort put into the assemblage of artistic materials that 
constitute an opera. She wants to appreciate this effort. But 
why does Badiou call it impure?
It’s impure in a similar way that cinema could be thought 
of as impure. Because there are so many artistic materials to 
assemble, it’s difficult to say what was part of the artistic 
vision, what was part of the idea, and what we might attri-
bute to happy—or unhappy—accident. An opera is a het-
erogeneous multiplicity insofar as it’s difficult to discern 
the will of the artistic idea when there have been so many 
hands involved: set designers, costume designers, lighting 
technicians, vocal performers, composers, conductors, 
musicians, etc. As Badiou puts it, the problem of the opera, 
then, becomes “changing chance into the infinite and noth-
ingness into purity” (p. 139). But why frame heterogeneous 
multiplicity in terms of chance and nothingness? The acci-
dent of chance is easy enough to understand, but why noth-
ingness? Here, we’ll part ways a bit from Badiou.
Nothingness and chance aren’t really all that different 
when it comes to the contingent, or what we might call acci-
dent. Chance is the coming to presence of the contingent, 
the coming to presence of the accidental. Nothingness is 
itself the backdrop of the contingent or accidental that’s 
always already there. Nothingness is the necessarily acci-
dental. Furthermore, if we’re to transform chance into the 
infinite, what must we do? The infinite is best thought of 
not in terms of an always one more, but in terms of that 
which is not finite, that which is without bounds, that which 
is unbound. Thus, chance must become the unbound. If 
we’re to transform nothingness into the pure, then what? 
We must make something come to presence from the back-
drop of what is always already there. And now, we’ll com-
pletely part ways with Badiou. I think the problem of opera 
is to bring forth transformed chance from transformed noth-
ingness. In other words, the problem of opera is to bring 
forth the unbound from the pure. But what does this mean?
Because the assemblage is a heterogeneous multiplicity, 
the performance itself is subject to boundless potentiality, 
subject to this, that is, until it’s performed. This is what’s 
brought forth from the nothingness transformed. And 
why must this nothingness be transformed? Artistic creation 
is creation ex nihilo, a bringing forth of something from 
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nothingness, an instance of poiesis. From this instance, we 
have the purity of the artistic idea. So now we’re ready to 
put the components of our formula together.
We must bring forth unbound potential from the pure. 
Taking a cue from Nietzsche, in this way, the opera, like 
other artistic creations says, “Thus I willed it,” to accident. 
We project our willing of the artistic idea backward from 
having projected it into the future from our original artistic 
vision. Perhaps this is a bit different from my nostalgia, 
something—taking a cue from her—I’m finding to be more 
and more disagreeable. Still, it shares the quality of living in 
the present as though it were the past. This isn’t all bad. It’s 
the only way we can shape the heterogeneous multiplicity 
of happy accidents, shaping it in a poetic way. We need to 
look back from the future to cultivate things that may turn 
out to be desirable that are happening now. In other words, 
we can’t leave accident to chance. Otherwise, we’re left 
with a nothingness that’s but a lack of vision.
Death Drives
Pursue your best or your worst desires, and above all 
perish! In both cases you are probably still in some way 
a promoter and benefactor of humanity and therefore 
entitled to your eulogists—but also to your detractors.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, 1974, The Gay Science, Book I, 
β1
I’m a ridiculously bad driver. I’m always causing almost 
accidents and getting lost. That she answered my jokingly 
posed question of, “Are they honking at me, or with me?” 
was an indication of her passenger’s side frustration. I’ve 
often wondered what the angrily honked car horn is meant 
to mean, exactly. I’m confused because it’s often followed 
by two mutually contravening glosses. It’s followed by 
either, “F*** you, a**hole,” or “F***ing die, you f***ing 
f***.” All this is yelled from the car that speeds past mine, 
Doppler effect in all its gloriously fading glissando sonority. 
I find it interesting that the first—subtracting the part about 
my being an a**hole—is something that I could find quite 
pleasant. Regarding the second, I’m going to die anyway, 
with any luck not in a car crash. So Eros and Thanatos, but 
when you break it down, all drives are actually death drives. 
Let’s not make so much of the fact that the second is that I 
“f***ingdie,” although I’m sure someone could petite mort 
it, also pleasant. But what does it mean to wish someone 
death, seeing, as I said, that I’m going to die anyway? And 
what would it mean to wish someone birth? Many things, 
for not everyone who will have died has been born.
At Home With Franz
She said that she did something bad. She was trying to open 
my kitchen window to smoke, and by accident, let in a 
whole bunch of ladybugs. I told her that it was okay, and 
that the ladybugs must have a nest outside my window. I 
added that those ladybugs, however, actually weren’t. They 
were Japanese beetles. She said that she knew. I told her 
that they wouldn’t bother us much except for the fact that 
they bite. This too she knew.
If I don’t vacuum them daily, there are noticeably large 
amounts of dead Japanese beetles lining the floor around the 
perimeters of all my rooms. They expend all their energy try-
ing to get back to where they once were. They’re constantly 
bumping into the walls trying to find the way they came in. 
Apparently, many of them don’t. I haven’t vacuumed in two 
days, and there are a little over twenty of them just by one wall.
The first time she came up, she had remarked that the 
hallways to my apartment were Kafkaesque. It’s an old 
building that used to be a hospital. When I pointed out the 
caduceus visible from my bedroom window, she wasn’t sur-
prised. She had grown up around a hospital environment. I 
guess the inside of my apartment is Kafkaesque also.
Hiding Places
And behind a door, he himself the door, is decked 
out in it like a weighty mask and, as sorcerer, will 
cast a spell on all who enter unawares . . . When he 
makes faces, he is told that all the clock need do is 
strike, and he will stay like that forever. In my hiding 
place, I realized what was true about all this. 
Whoever discovered me could hold me petrified, 
confine me for life within the heavy door. Should the 
person looking for me uncover my lair, I would 
therefore give a loud shout to loose the demon that 
had transformed me—indeed, without waiting for the 
moment of discovery, would anticipate its arrival 
with a cry of self-liberation.
—Walter Benjamin, 2006a, Berlin Childhood Around 
1900, pp. 99-100
I used to have a lot of dreams about childhood as a kid. I 
still do, but I used to, too. If dreams are any indication of 
what preoccupies us during the day, it must’ve been the 
same for Benjamin. Benjamin had a ceaseless fascination 
with childhood. Here, in the passage above, the partitioning 
veil of the door becomes part of the hidden child. Behind 
the veil is an openness, the openness of being exposed, an 
exposure that can perdure as but an openness partitioned 
given certain circumstances. And it’s either the passage of 
time or discovery that can freeze the child in this perpetual 
state, namely, freeze his face in this way, freeze his face 
with a surface so that it can never be on the other side of the 
veil. In other words, the truth that one can discover in the 
place of hiding is that the habitual threatens to petrify one 
behind the veil so that the veil is no longer a partition, but 
part of one’s being. Discovery can do the same thing, to 
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fuse one with the veil behind which one is discovered, and 
as a precaution, the child runs out from the hiding place and 
lets loose a cry, a cry that’s but a voice without meaning, a 
cry that’s only a natural index pointing to one being there.
But what is this cry of self-liberation? It’s emancipatory, 
but is it the self that liberates? No, rather the self is liber-
ated, for this self is the structure of self, the subject, the self 
that comes between two signifiers. It’s the cause of the 
Other, the pressure of the Other that presses against the self 
of an “I” to produce the subject. And this subject can only 
let forth a cry, a sound without meaning. Here, the subject 
isn’t a speaking position, but a place from which the Other 
recognizes the subject as having the capacity to speak, as 
having the potential. This isn’t the subject of natural birth, 
isn’t the subject willfully bringing itself forth from neces-
sary nothingness. It’s the subject who’s birth is but the 
attempted escape of contingency, who’s anxious birth is the 
result of the perceiving—reasonably or not—an impending 
threat of accidental discovery. This is the subject born from 
the coercive look given to the special being.
I find it interesting that Benjamin is here returning to this 
passage in Berlin Childhood Around 1900. A nearly identi-
cal passage exists in One-Way Street, written almost a 
decade before. The only difference, subtle but major, is that 
Benjamin doesn’t use the first person in the passage in One-
Way Street. Perhaps one can only reflect upon childhood 
from the perspective of an adult when one is no longer fro-
zen to the veil of childhood, when the enunciating subject 
and the subject of the utterance become cleaved through 
poiesis. I wonder if in the interim someone had reminded 
him that he was no longer a child, reminded him without 
recourse to the invasive discovery of looking behind the 
door. Sometimes reminders are necessary, necessary for one 
who might be fascinated by almost anything whatever, per-
haps necessary also for those of us who hide.
Mess and Tidy
Untidy child.—Each stone he finds, each flower he 
picks, and each butterfly he catches is already the 
start of a collection, and every single thing he owns 
makes up one great collection. In him this passion 
shows its true face, the stern Indian expression that 
lingers on, but with a dimmed and manic glow, in 
antiquarians, researchers, bibliomaniacs.
—Walter Benjamin, 2004, One-Way Street, p. 465
“Sotidy.” This is what she repeated to me. I still hallucinate 
its echoes as I realign pieces of furniture, vacuum Japanese 
beetles, disinfect the can of disinfectant with the other can 
of disinfectant that, while kept for this end, I keep hidden. 
I’m aware that this is a strange behavior, an unnecessary 
one that comforts me. It comforts me, but I suspect that it 
would disquiet others should it be discovered by accident. 
Anticipating this—reasonably or not—one can take this 
confession as my cry of self-liberation.
But in other ways, I’m untidy, just older. Like Benjamin, 
I like antiques, do research, have a bunch of books. Not 
only does the glow fade into mania, but one also learns to 
hide one’s untidiness, and perhaps I’ve become fused to this 
partition because the clock has long since struck. Not for 
nothing is this passage from the vignette preceding the one 
of the hidden child in One-Way Street. In Berlin Childhood, 
the nearly identical vignette is preceded by one titled “The 
Mummerehlen.” In it, Benjamin writes, “Early on, I learned 
to disguise myself in words, which really were clouds. The 
gift of perceiving similarities is, in fact, nothing but a weak 
remnant of the old compulsion to become similar and to 
behave mimetically” (p. 97). I used to disguise myself in 
words. I still do, but I used to, too. Like Benjamin, it’s a 
habit I learned early.
Chain Smoking
The essay on the Bildungsroman is actually a frag-
ment from one of Bakhtin’s several lost books . . . 
Bakhtin retained only certain preparatory materials 
and a prospectus of the book; due to the paper short-
age, he had torn them up page by page during the war 
to make wrappers for his endless chain of cigarettes. 
He began smoking pages from the conclusion of the 
manuscript, so what we have is a small portion of its 
opening section, primarily about Goethe.
—Michael Holquist, 1986
“Introduction” to Bakhtin’s Speech Genres and Other 
Late Essays, p. xiii
Does habit trump poiesis? Or is it simply that only the 
bringing forth matters? Like Bakhtin, I can only chain-
smoke, and at that, chain-smoke properly speaking. Many 
self-proclaimed chain-smokers light each new cigarette. I 
light new ones from the almost extinguished bits of 
tobacco. When she hand rolled her cigarettes, they often 
went out. It didn’t seem to bother her at all.
Lost Umbrella
One is with the woman one loves, speaks with her. 
Then, weeks or months later, separated from her, one 
thinks again of what was talked of then. And now the 
motif seems banal, tawdry, shallow, and one realizes 
that it was she alone, bending low over it with love, 
who shaded and sheltered it before us, so that the 
thought was alive in all its folds and crevices like a 
relief. Alone, as now, we see it lie flat, bereft of com-
fort and shadow, in the light of our knowledge.
—Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 466
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Notice that Benjamin doesn’t say that one is loved by the 
woman, only that she has love, that she’s with it. In some 
conversations, I also felt that she provided me shade and 
shelter, but was it for things or from things? That had both-
ered me. The question has disappeared, though. I realize only 
now that it doesn’t matter. She’s generous, and either way, 
the shade and shelter was provided from the place of love.
The Poem
[P]oetry is the song of language qua capacity to make 
the pure notion of the “thereis” present in the very 
effacement of its empirical objectivity.
—Alain Badiou, 2005, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 
“What Is a Poem?” p. 22
To say that the poem she gave me was the most beautiful 
gift I’ve ever received still seems to underestimate it some-
how. I will say definitively, though, that the poem wasn’t 
shared with me. It was a gift, and the fact that it was given 
overwhelms me with something, I know not what. The 
poem, as we’ve been saying, brings forth into existence 
something not there before. Not only was the poem itself 
brought into existence, but it also brings forth something in 
me. This is generally how we think of poiesis, but Badiou 
adds something to this definition. He affirms that the poem 
is a bringing forth, but it’s a bringing forth that can bring 
forth in spite of the effacement of its empirical objectivity. 
In other words, the poem can bring to presence a naming 
while effacing that which is named, while effacing the ref-
erent. In this way, what the poem is capable of bringing 
forth is the unnamable.
And what is this unnamable thing that poetry brings 
forth? It’s language itself. Language functions truthfully 
without recourse to the referent. Neither the signified, signi-
fier, nor sign of which the former two are parts are the actual 
thing we assume to exist independently from the orders of 
the imaginary and symbolic. Although its occupation is one 
of indeterminacy, we might think of the referent as occupy-
ing the real. Language can do without the real. In fact, it 
must do without the real, for the real can only remain inas-
similable. The real is where lack is lacking, so it’s without 
language’s necessary condition, without the condition of 
negation.
While it’s true that this is true of all poetry, I find her 
poem to be this song. It makes perpetual something that 
may become effaced, forgotten by remaining with me as the 
unforgettable. It makes perpetual something I find to be 
inassimilable, something that I cannot name. This some-
thing that I cannot name, she named with her poem. These 
words that I write seem at least partially in vain. These 
words that I write are in some sense but an attempt to do 
what she’s already done. In another sense, these words are 
also an attempt to come to terms with anxiety and nostalgia 
through poetry’s complement, through philosophy.
Philosophy and Returning a 
Borrowed Book
The Stimmung of anxiety appears here [in Heidegger’s 
What Is Metaphysics? (1995)] as comprehensible only 
in reference to a lautlose Stimme, a voice without sound 
that “attunes us to the terror of the abyss.” Anxiety is 
nothing more than the vocation attuned to that Voice.
* * *
Philosophy, which is born precisely as an attempt to 
liberate poetry from its “inspiration,” finally manages 
to grasp the Muse and transform it, as “spirit,” into its 
own subject; but this spirit is, precisely, the negative, 
and the “most beautiful voice” that belongs to the 
Muse of the philosophers, according to Plato, is a 
voice without sound.
* * *
Philosophy is this voyage, the human word’s nostos 
(return) from itself to itself. Which abandoning its 
own habitual dwelling place in the voice, opens itself 
to the terror of nothingness, and at the same time, to 
the marvel of being; and after becoming meaningful 
discourse, it returns in the end as absolute wisdom, to 
the Voice. Only in the Absolute can the word, which 
experienced “homesickness” and the “pain of return” 
(nost-algia), which experienced the negative always 
already reigning in its habitual dwelling place, now 
truly reach its own beginning in the Voice.
—Giorgio Agamben, 1991, Language and Death,  
pp. 60, 78, 93
I’ll attempt to synthesize these three important moments in 
Agamben’s Language and Death. They’re moments in the 
argument about philosophy and the Voice, something that 
here should be understood as the voice without sound: The 
Voice without sound is the negation proper to language, and 
when one is called by the voice without sound, called by 
meaning without speech, one experiences being. It’s for this 
reason that the Muse of philosophy is this voice without 
sound. However, an attunement to this voice is also to have 
anxiety. To be engaged in philosophy, however, relieves 
this anxiety insofar the word passes through this anxiety, 
and experiencing nostalgia, returns after its departure from 
the voice back to its origin. But why is this significant?
I think that there’s an important point to be made about 
what’s communicated through silence. Philosophy’s muse 
is a silent muse, and the silence that’s behind philosophiz-
ing is indeed both anxiety provoking and the cause for nos-
talgia. However, when words are deployed in meaningful 
discourse, they can return to this silent voice that had initially 
called out to us. When they return, the words will have 
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passed through both anxiety and nostalgia. In this way, phi-
losophy makes us sophisticated, gives us wisdom. Literally, 
it loves wisdom. In other words, these words, the words that 
I’m writing, are a sublimation of a nascent love. They’re a 
satisfaction of the drives through an inhibition of their aims. 
By satisfying the drives, one avoids becoming caught up in 
desire. I find myself put in this position.
My Muse has been silent. I made a promise not to force 
song from her, and I don’t know what else to do but direct my 
love into what I’m writing. It’s been many weeks, and I can 
only interpret her silence as an indication to love her without 
hope. She shouldn’t refuse the words in this book. Unlike her 
poem, they aren’t a gift. From the beginning, the words have 
always been hers. They’re only returning home.
One-Way Street
The only way of knowing a person is to love that 
person without hope.
—Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street, p. 467
She was sitting on the steps to my apartment smoking a 
hand-rolled cigarette. She asked me if I was pissed. I told 
her that I was only worried about the car ride back home. 
In the car, I tried to convince her not to break it off. In her 
driveway, I tried to put the front wheel back on her bike. 
She ended up having to do it herself. Her last words to me 
were, “I’ll think about it.” These are words that come after, 
the words that come back. The words had been a loan.
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